In the previous weeks, I investigated the concept of chance and focused mainly on the distinction between accidental and methodical. This distinction highlights the difference between something that happens randomly (once or maybe one among many trials in an unpredictable way) or something that happens on a predictable basis after a certain number of trials (Malone, 2009). This made me think that chance should be contextualised in probabilistic theory as this theory is concerned with the explanation of occurrences, events, and randomness (Stevens, 2006). Interestingly the link between chance and probability should be dated back to the Greek literature as the games of chance were described in the Trojan wars. In fact, the first dice is dated back to almost 3000 before Christ (Bennett, 2011). Despite chance being so prevalent in games from so early on it was not until quite late when a theory of probability was developed. Many scholars have questioned why probability theories were developed so late and it seems that it might be due to a deterministic epistemology dominant until at least the 16th century. Determinism assumes that only a certain number of factors can account for a number of outcomes and it is not possible to consider alternative choices (Loewer, 2001). In fact, the use of chance in art at the beginning of the 20th century emerged as a reaction to the determinism dominant in the 18th and 19th centuries (Iversen, 2010).
Probabilistic theory can help us to understand whether certain outcomes are probable or improbable. Nickerson (2004) makes an important distinction between irregularity and randomness. He argues that when something happens on an irregular basis does not mean is random. For example, I may toss a coin ten times, and it might be that it yields 10 heads in a row. Hence, there is an irregularity but there is no randomness as if I would continue tossing the coin I would reach a 50:50 ratio distribution in the heads and tails. This is what Nickerson (2004) would call “chance irregularity”. Hence, we could say that chance irregularity might be present in methodical chance as there might be irregularities but patterns can end up being predictable, especially after a number of trials. If we want to put this in statistical terms we could use a regression equation:
Y = X1 + X2+…Xn+e
The Y would represent the outcome, that is, what we are trying to achieve in our artistic creation. The X would represent the different factors that can play a role in shaping the outcome, and E would represent the error as it is virtually impossible to know all the possible factors that may play a role in the outcome (Osborne, 2002). In methodical chance, the artist is playing with multiple repetitions to try to predict what the variables are and what value the variables should have in order to attain a specific outcome. However, in accidental chance it is not possible to predict those variables as in this type of chance, randomness would be present, following Nickerson (2004).
In methodical chance, after a number of repetitions, it is indeed possible to make very accurate predictions. This brings back again the debate of agency and whether this may be placed as opposite in the continuum of chance (Malone, 2009). Agency is defined as ‘attributable to those persons (and things …) who/which are seen as initiating causal sequences … events caused by acts of mind or will or intention … An agent is the source, the origin, of causal events, independently of the state of the physical universe’ (Gell, 1998, p. 16). Therefore, agency is the ability to create in different ways and as such more than one course of action is plausible. Agency disappears when the agent can no longer make a difference and there is only a single course of action (Giddens, 1984). If we link this with our discussion around chance so far, we can find the following: First, in accidental chance, agency would only be present in the act of choosing a specific image. The process of creation in this type of chance is random as it happens accidentally or by luck (Nickerson, 2004). Agency only happens when the photographer for example has to select an image over a set of images that have been taken randomly as more than one course of action is possible. Second, in methodical chance agency would take place in the process of creation. Images here are made not taken. The photographer has to decipher the different factors needed in order to attain a specific outcome. Here the photographer has to make conscious choices bearing in mind the outcome they may want to achieve. However, different levels of the factors or even different factors can potentially lead to the same outcome. Hence, as suggested by Giddens (1984) the photographer has more than a single course of action to make their images. Finally, when the photographer can make perfect predictions and can achieve specific outcomes after a very few trials this leads to the mechanisation of the creative process. This mechanisation would entail zero chance and potentially very limited agency as only one alternative would be followed to attain a single outcome. It is interesting to note that despite these differences, the beholder may not be capable to differentiate whether chance has taken place when confronted with images that have emerged through the three different processes outlined. This may only happen if the beholder is shown the different processes followed to achieve a specific image. It would be naive to assume that the beholder has the capacity to make such inferences without receiving more information that the outcomes themselves. This resonates with Barthes’s argument in the Death of the author (1977) about the tendency to mistakenly see the work as a direct message from the creator. However, the work created is subject to interpretations but for this to happen accurately in regards to chance it may imply having additional information.
In our discussion around accidental, methodical, and mechanical chance it is pertinent to bring the concept of aura (Benjamin, 1935). For Benjamin (1935) aura was the unique aesthetic authority of a work of art, or in other words, it is what makes a work of art authentic. Hence, for Benjamin, a work can only be called a work of art if it is original and does not emerge from reproduction. Following this and considering the three types of chance (i.e., accidental, methodical, and mechanical), accidental chance would have aura as it’s impossible to reproduce. Aura would be present to a lower extent in methodical chance as repetition is present and in fact, Benjamin would challenge whether this could be called art. Finally, mechanical chance would be the perfect example of no aura as it’s based on statistics and reproducibility. Hence, this opens a debate not only about the role of the practitioner in the creation of the work but also a debate about what can be considered art when introducing chance in one’s own practice.
Reading about this has been extremely helpful to connect different concepts and making me reflect on the creative process. This will serve as a foundation for this final project in which I will explore the boundaries of chance. Can accidental and mechanical chance co-exist? Can we kill the chance in artistic creation? When does methodical chance turn mechanical? These are some of the questions I would like to start exploring in these weeks.
References
Barthes, R. (1977). Image-music-text. Macmillan.
Benjamin, W. (2008). The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. Penguin UK.
Bennet, D. (2011). Defining Randomness. In S. Prasanta Bandyopadhyay & R. Malcom Forster (Eds.) Philosophy of Statistics (pp. 633-638) Oxford: Elsevier.
Gell, A. (1998). Art and agency: an anthropological theory. Oxford: University Press.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Iversen, M. (2010). Chance. MIT/Whitechapel Gallery.
Loewer, B. (2001). Determinism and chance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 32(4), 609-620.
Malone, M. (2009). Chance aesthetics. Mildred Lane Kemper Art Museum.
Nickerson, R. S. (2004). Cognition and chance: The psychology of probabilistic reasoning. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Osborne, J. W. (2000). Prediction in multiple regression. Practical Assessment, Research, and Evaluation, 7(1), 2.
Strevens, M. (2006). Probability and chance. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, second edition. Macmillan Reference USA, Detroit.
Alberto Gonzalez 